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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA:
THE END OF AN ERA
Laughlin McDonald *
I. INTRODUCTION
On the last day of 1971 Term the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Furman v. Georgia1 invali-
dating the capital sentences of approximately 600 inmates on
death rows across the country. The decision was at once un-
precedented yet the result of a clear abolitionist trend at
almost every level of the system of criminal justice of the
United States. The decision was surprising, unexpected, an
apparently radical break with our history, but it was also a
decision whose time was irresistably at hand. Public reaction
to the ruling conceded as much. While there were protests
from some, those protests seemed perfunctory. Certainly they
were not of the same intensity and conviction as those which
followed, and still follow, the school desegregation cases of
the fifties or the criminal confession cases of the sixties. The
public mood at the time of announcement of the decision was
one of acquiescence and acknowledgment that in abolishing
the death penalty the court had but done in a formal way
what had come to be our actual practice.
Furman v. Georgia settles certain issues beyond all ques-
tion. It settles the fact all current death sentences are uncon-
stitutional and may not be carried out.2 Following Furman v.
Georgia, all of the 118 capital cases before it were reversed by
the Supreme Court as to sentence.3 These cases, from 26 states,
* Member of the S. C. Bar. Director of the Southern Regional Office,
A.C.L.U. Foundation, Inc., Atlanta, Ga. B.A., Columbia University, 1960;
LL.B., Virginia, 1965.
1. 408 U.S. 283, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972). Jackson v. Georgia and Branch
v. Texas were the remaining cases in the consolidated opinion. On October 10,
1972, the Supreme Court denied motions for rehearing filed by Texas, Georgia
and other states affected by Furman v. Georgia. - U.S. -, 34 L. Ed. 2d 163.
2. "The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is there-
fore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and
the cases are remanded for further proceedings:' Id. at 346.
3. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, and companion cases, 408 U.S. 744-66
(1972).
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involved widely differing factual situations and procedural
postures. Some were appeals and petitions for certiorari from
state courts including those in which the state court had
determined the Eighth Amendment issue and those in which
it had not.4 Some were state post-conviction cases in which
the Eighth Amendment had been raised and in which it had
not.5 Some were federal habeas corpus cases including those
in which the Eighth Amendment issue was apparently never
raised. 6 While in most cases sentencing was entirely within
the jury's discretion, in some cases the judge did the sen-
tencing or had the power of overriding a jury recommendation
of either life or death.? Some cases involved brutal murder,"
some mass murder,9 and some the murder of law enforcement
officers,10 felony murder," and aggravated rape.12 Furman
thus settles the fact that "capital punishment within the con-
fines of the statutes now before us has for all practical pur-
poses run its course"' 3 and that the sentence of death may not
be imposed upon those defendants awaiting trial on charges.
for which capital punishment was formerly an alternative.
1 4
4. Compare Marks v. Louisiana, 408 U.S. 933 (1972); State v. Marks, 25Z
La. 277, 211 S.E.2d 261 (1968); with Hurst v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 935 (1972);
People v. Hurst, 42 Ill. 2d 217, 247 N.E. 2d 614 (1969).
5. Compare Duisen v. Missouri, 408 U.S. 945 (1972); Duisen v. State,
441 S.W. 2d 688 (Mo. 1969) ; with Lokos v. Alabama, 408 U.S. 935 (1972);
Lokos v. State, 284 Ala. 53, 221 So. 2d 689 (1969).
6. E.g., Mefford v. Warden, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Mefford v. Warden,
413 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1969) ; Mefford v. Warden, 270 F. Supp. 745 (D. Md.
1967) ; Mefford v. Warden, 243 Md. 946, 221 A.2d 906 (1966) ; and Mefford v.
State, 235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964).
7. E.g., Seeney v. Delaware, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); Strong v. Maryland,
408 U.S. 939 (1972) ; and, Morford v. Hocker, 408 U.S. 934 (1972).
8. E.g., Jackson v. Beto, 408 U.S. 937 (1972), reversing, 428 F.2d 1054
(5th Cir. 1970).
9. E.g., Alford v. Eyman, 408 U.S. 939 (1972), reversing, Eyman v. Al-
ford, 448 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1969).
10. E.g., Atkinson v. South Carolina, 408 U.S. 936 (1972), reversing sub-
nom., State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970).
11. E.g., Boykin v. Florida, 408 U.S. 940 (1972), reversing sub nons.,
Boykin v. State, 257 So.2d 251 (Fla. 1971).
12. E.g., Chance v. North Carolina, 408 U.S. 940 (1972), reversing sub-
nona., State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643, 185 S.E.2d 277 (1971).
13. 33 L.Ed.2d at 392. Furman v. Georgia is presently being implemented
by state and lower federal courts. See, e.g., Newman v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d
615 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Sims v. Eyman, - F2d __ (9th Cir. 1972); and State
v. Atkinson, SmITH'S Amy. SHT. No. 25 (Aug. 24, 1972).
14. Dissenting opinion of Justice Powell, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 452.
2
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What the decision does not clearly settle, however, is whether
capital punishment per se has also run its course or whether
some version embodied in other and appropriate statutes would
pass the test of constitutionality. Only two Justices for the
majority, Brennan and Marshall, 15 specifically held capital
punishment under all circumstances to be a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The other three Justices speaking for the
majority, White, Stewart and Douglas, did not reach the ulti-
mate issue decided by Brennan and Marshall basing their
opinions rather upon the arbitrary and discriminatory way
in which the death sentence has been imposed in the United
States.' 6 The four dissenters, even though two of them, Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, confessed that they
were personally opposed to the death penalty, 17 and a third,
15. See concurring opinion of Justice Brennan: "The punishment of death
is therefore 'cruel and unusual' and the States may no longer inflict it as a
punishment for crimes." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 387; and concurring opinion of Justice
Marshall: "We achieve 'a major milestone in the long road up from bar-
barism' [footnote omitted] and join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions
in the world which celebrate their regard for civilization and humanity by
shunning capital punishment." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 425.
16. See concurring opinion of Justice Stewart: "I simply conclude that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 390; concurring opinion
of Justice White: "I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes before
us are now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat
of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice."
.33 L. Ed. 2d at 392; and, concurring opinion of Justice Douglas: "Thus, these
discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant
with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the
idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and
-unusual' punishments." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 359.
17. See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger: "If we were possessed
of legislative power, I would either join with Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr.
Justice Marshall or, at the very least, restrict the use of capital punishment
to a small category of the most heinous crimes." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 428; and dis-
senting opinion of Justice Blackmun: "I yield to no one in the depth of my
distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its
aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite
minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no
useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood's training
and life's experiences, and is not compatible with the philosophical convictions
I have been able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of 'reverence for
life.' Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for the policy
reasons argued by counsel for the respective petitioners and expressed and
3
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Justice Powell, regretted "the failure of some legislative
bodies to address the capital punishment issue with greater
frankness or effectiveness,"'18 all invoked judicial restraint
in justification of their stand not to hold the death penalty
unconstitutional. 9
Although the majority opinion decides much, much is
left in doubt. Since only two members of the Court found the
death penalty unconstitutional per se, the dissenters indulged
the implied assumption that capital punishment under some
circumstances would be constitutional.20 Chief Justice Burger
suggests that state legislatures might comply with the Court's
ruling by providing standards for judges and juries to follow
in determining sentence in capital cases or by defining with
greater precision than heretofore those crimes for which the
death penalty could be imposed.21 He also speculates that the
adopted in the several opinions filed by the Justices who vote to reverse these
convictions." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 445-46.
18. 33 L. Ed. 2d at 480.
19. See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger: "The highest judicial
duty is to recognize the limits on judicial power to permit the democratic
processes to deal with matters falling outside those limits." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 445;
dissenting opinion of Justice Powell: "With deference and respect for the views
of the Justices who differ, it seems to me that . . . as a matter of policy and
precedent this is a classic case for the exercise of our oft-announced allegiance
to judicial restraint." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 479; dissenting opinion of Justice Black-
mun: "There-on the Legislative Branch of the State or Federal Government,
and secondarily, on the Executive Branch-is where the authority and respon-
sibility for this kind of action lies. The authority should not be taken over
by the judiciary in the modern guise of an Eighth Amendment issue." 33 L.
Ed. 2d at 448; and dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist: "It is for this
reason that judicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an expressed,
condition of the grant of authority of judicial review. The Court's holding in
these cases has been reached, I believe, in complete disregard of that implied
condition." 33 L. Ed. 2d at 483. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Blackmun were of the further stated opinion that the Eighth Amendment was
no bar to imposition of the death penalty.
20. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, 408 U.S. 417, note 2:
"While statutes in 40 states permit capital punishment for a variety of crimes,
the constitutionality of a very few mandatory statutes remains undecided ....
Since Rhode Island's only capital statute-murder by a life term prisoner-
is mandatory, no law in that State is struck down by virtue of the Court's
decision today." The remaining mandatory death statutes are: 10 U.S.C. §906
(acting as a spy for the enemy in time of war); MAss. GENanAL LAWS, ch. 265
§2 (murder during the commission of forcible rape) ; and OHIO REvsFD CODE,
Tit. 29, §§2901.09-2901.10 (assassination of the President or Governor of a
state).
21. 33 L.Ed.2d at 442.
4
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,only "safe" course state legislatures might pursue would be
to provide mandatory death sentences, thereby denying the
jury an opportunity to exercise its discretion in the arbitrary
manner condemned by the majority. In the same breath, how-
ever, the Chief Justice confesses doubts about the constitu-
tionality of such a capital punishment scheme:
If this is the only alternative that the legislatures can safely pursue
under today's ruling, I would have preferred that the Court opt for
total abolition . . . I could more easily be persuaded that mandatory
sentences of death, without the intervening and ameliorating impact
of lay jurors, are so arbitrary and doctrinaire that they violate the
Constitution.
22
These doubts are echoed by another dissenter, Justice Black-
mun: "This approach, it seems to me, encourages legislation
that is regressive and of antique mold, for it eliminates the
element of mercy in the imposition of punishment. I thought
we had passed beyond that point in our criminology long
ago. '2 3 Apparently, then the kind of precision in definition
and imposition of the death penalty which the dissent suggests
would satisfy at least two of the majority, i.e. mandatory
death sentence for certain crimes, would be rejected by an
equal number of dissenters. The Chief Justice, quoting Justice
Harlan, concedes as well that all past efforts to meticulously
define and devise standards for imposition of the death pen.-
alty have been "uniformly unsuccessful. ' 24 Thus, the avail..
ability of capital punishment to state legislatures through
statutory changes may be more theoretical than actual.
II. THE RESTORATION MOVEMENT
Several states have now taken steps to resurrect the death
penalty. Florida enacted a new death law on December 8, 1972,
classifying felonies into five categories: capital felonies, life
felonies, and felonies in the first, second and third degrees.
The capital felonies for which either death or life imprison-
ment may be imposed, are: rape, premeditated murder, mur-
der committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of or
in the attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, aircraft piracy, bombing or distribution of heroin
22. Id. at 443.
23. Id. at 450.
24. Id. at 443.
766 [Vol. 24
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where the drug is the cause of death of the user.2 5 Those con-
victed of capital felonies are entitled to have an advisory of
death or life imprisonment rendered in a separate sentencing
trial by jury based upon aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. By terms of the statute, aggravating factors are lim-
ited to whether:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence
of imprisonment;
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person;
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to
many persons;
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit any rob-
bery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful
throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain;
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the
the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement
of laws;
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
Mitigating factors include whether:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
activity;
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to the act;
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony com-
mitted by another person and his participation was relatively minor;
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the sub-
stantial domination of another person;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired;
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
26
25. FLA. STAT. §782.04 and §794.01 (1972). The only specified life felony
involves the intentional impairment of the ability of the United States or any
state to defend itself or wage war. Upon conviction, punishment is life im-
prisonment or imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years. Punish-
ment for conviction of felonies in the first, second, and third degrees vary
depending upon the degree of harm done. See FLA. STAT. §790.16 (1972).
26. FLA. STAT. §921.141 (1972).
6
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Notwithstanding the recommendation of the jury, the trial
judge enters final sentence of death or life imprisonment.27
In each case in which death is imposed, the court must set
forth in writing findings of fact based upon the record of
trial and the sentencing proceedings, including aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. 2 The judgment of conviction
and sentence of death are subject to automatic review by the
Supreme Court of Florida within sixty days after certification
of the record and have priority over all other cases.
29
The new Florida death law and its provisions for separate
trial as to sentence, findings of fact by the court based upon
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each case in
which death is imposed, and automatic review by the Supreme
Court marks an attempt to make sentencing visible and ra-
tional. It does not, however, avoid what was condemned in
Furman v. Georgia-discretion and the arbitrariness which
inevitably flows from it. As long as the grand jury has the
prerogative to indict or not to indict, the prosecutor the au-
thority to determine when, how and what to prosecute,30 the
27. FLA. STAT. §775.082 (1972). Those sentenced to life imprisonment upon
conviction of capital felonies are required to serve no less than twenty-five years
before becoming eligible for parole. For those convicted of life felonies and
sentenced to life imprisonment, there is no statutory minimum period to be
served before eligibility for parole, while those convicted of life felonies but not
sentenced to life imprisonment must be sentenced to a minimum of thirty years.
28. FLA. STAT. §921.141 (1972).
29. Id.
30. One charged with murder, for example, could be prosecuted for a cap-
ital felony pursuant to §782.04 (1) (a) and receive death:
(1) (a) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated
from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed
or any human being, or when committed by a person engaged in
the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, kidnaping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throw-
ing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, or
which resulted from the unlawful distribution of heroin by a
person over the age of seventeen (17) years when such drug
is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user shall
be murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony,
punishable as provided in §775.082.
or for a felony of the first degree pursuant to Section 782.04 (a), and receive
a maximum penalty of thirty years imprisonment, or when specifically pro-
vided by statute imprisonment for life:
(2) When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to an-
other, and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life,
although without any premeditated design to effect the death of
7
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jury the right to convict or acquit and the governor the power
to grant or withhold clemency, the death penalty remains
part of a discretionary sentencing structure. Furthermore,
many of the features of the Florida law are characteristic of
sentencing schemes found unconstitutional in Furman V.
Georgia and companion cases. California, Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania and Texas all had statutes providing for
bifurcated trials on the issues of guilt and sentence in capital
cases similar to those now provided for in Florida.31 Yet in
cases from Pennsylvania, Connecticut and Texas, the Supreme
Court reversed capital sentences.3 2 As for the findings of fact
required of the trial court when it imposes death and the
standards established to guide the jury in advising as to sen-
tence, the Supreme Court has held, not only that such are not
constitutionally required and are "meaningless," but that they
may actually inhibit consideration of the variety of factors
which should inform the determination of sentence.
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human
knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or
any particular individual or when committed in the perpetration of
or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
kidnaping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or dis-
charging of a destructive device or bomb, except as provided in
subsection (1), it shall be murder in the second degree and shall
constitute a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison for life, or for such term of years as may be
determined by the court.
or for a felony of the second degree pursuant to Section 782.04 (3), and receive
a maximum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment:
(3) When perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a
person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpe-
trate any felony, other than arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kid-
naping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharg-
ing of a destructive device or bomb, it shall be murder in the third
degree and shall constitute a felony of the second degree, punish-
able as provided in section 775.082, §775.083, or §775.084.
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.1 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv.
§53a-46 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§125.30, 125.35 (McKinney, Cum.
Supp. 1968) ; 18 PA. STAT. ANN. §4701 (1963) ; and TEx. CoDE Casm. PRo. art.
37.07 (1967). See also Act of March 27, 1970, No. 1333, GA. LAws 1970 at 949.
32. See e.g., Scoleri v. Pennsylvania, 408 U.S. 934 (1972); Davis v. Con-
necticut, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); and Morales v. Texas, 408 U.S. 938 (1972).
California had previously had its death penalty declared unconstitutional by
its Supreme Court, while no capital cases from New York were pending before
the United States Supreme Court at the time of decision of Furman v. Georgia.
769
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death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. The
States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly
awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act
with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will con-
sider a variety of factors, many of which will have been suggested
by the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court
to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could
inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of
circumstances would ever be really complete. The infinite variety of
cases and facets to each case would make general standards either
meaningless "boiler-plate" or a statement of the obvious that no jury
would need.
83
The Florida death law seems in no essential feature different
from those of other states found unconstitutional in Furman
v. Georgia.
Not all death penalty restoration efforts have been a
response to Furman v. Georgia. In California, after the de-
cision of the California Supreme Court of February 18, 1972,
declaring the death penalty to be in violation of its state law,
3 4
an initiative was adopted in the November, 1972 general elec-
tion to restore the death penalty. The measure adopted
provides:
Sec. 27. All statutes of this state in effect on February 17, 1972,
requiring, authorizing, imposing, or relating to the death penalty are
in full force effect, subject to legislative amendment or repeal by stat-
ute, initiative, or referendum.
The death penalty provided for under those statutes shall not be
deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual pun-
ishments within the meaning of Article I, Section 6 nor shall such
punishment for such offenses be deemed to contravene any other pro-
vision of this constitution.
On February 17, 1972, death was authorized as the pen-
alty for eight offenses in California: treason, perjury in cap-
ital cases, first degree murder, kidnapping for ransom or rob-
bery with bodily harm to the victim, train wrecking, malicious
assault by life prisoner, explosion of destructive devices caus-
ing great bodily injury, and sabotage resulting in death or
great bodily injury.3r Death was mandatory for treason, per-
jury in capital cases and malicious assault by a life termer
33. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971).
34. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152
(1972).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE §§37, 128, 190, 209, 219, 4500, 12310, and CAL. Mu.
& VET. CODE §1672(e).
9
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if a non-inmate victim dies. For other offenses death was
discretionary.
The California initiative was placed on the ballot by the
California Prison Guards Association. 36 Thereafter, Furman
v. Georgia was decided and still later the initiative was ap-
proved in the November, 1972 general elections. While no one
could seriously contend that the initiative nullifies Furman v.
Georgia, the argument is made that even if death may not be
imposed for violation of those crimes for which death was
formerly discretionary, nothing in Furman v. Georgia pro-
hibits retention of the mandatory death offenses and impos-
ing sentences of death for violation of them. Whether or not
the Supreme Court will approve mandatory death penalties
remains to be seen. However, no Justice presently sitting on
the Court has stated that he would do so. Those who did specu-
late on the matter in Furman v. Georgia either inferred that
they would not, or categorically stated they would oppose the
death penalty under any circumstances.*
III. DE FACTO ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
What response South Carolina through its legislature
might make to Furman v. Georgia is speculative. However,
there are objective indicators which inform speculation. One
indicator is the practice of the past. If the immediate history
of capital punishment in South Carolina is a reliable guide
to what the future holds, the conclusion may be fairly drawn
that the State has abandoned the death penalty as a punish-
ment for crime.
The last public executions in South Carolina took place
a decade ago on April 20, 1962.37 Two men were electrocuted,
one for the crime of murder, the other for rape. On that date,
*Editor's Note: After this issue had gone to press the North Carolina
Supreme Court reinstated a mandatory death penalty for the crimes of first
degree murder, first degree burglary, rape and arson by striking the provisions
for jury recommendations for life sentences from N.C. GEN. STAT. §§14-17, 14-
21, 14-52, 14-58 (1969). State v. Waddell, 41 U.S.L.W. 2398 (N.C. Jan. 18,
1973).
36. See The New York Times, Nov. 12, 1972, §1 at 38.
37. The News and Courier (Charleston, S.C.), May 30, 1971, §B at 14.
10
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three others were also on death row.38 Since then twenty-four
people have been convicted of capital crimes and sentenced
to death by the courts of the State. Prior to Furman V.
Georgia, eleven of the unexcuted capital convictions and sen-
tences were in some stage of post conviction review: four on
direct appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court;39 two
on petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court ;40 and five pending on motion for new trial in the sen-
tencing court.41 Of the remaining sixteen people sentenced to
death, three had their sentences commuted by the Governor,42
and thirteen had their convictions or sentences reversed. In
view of the fact that several of the thirteen had multiple
trials, their collective box score shows two reversals by the
United States Supreme Court,43 nine by the South Carolina
Supreme Court,44 one by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit,4r and five by the Circuit Courts of the State.46 Of the
38. State v. Bostick, 243 S.C. 14, 131 S.E2d 841 (1963); State v. White,
243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963) ; and State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 129
S.E.2d 330 (1963).
39. State v. Minor, Notice of Appeal filed on July 30, 1969. State v.
Crowe, opinion No. 19404, April 21, 1972. State v. Bellue, opinion No. 19520,
November 20, 1972. State v. Gibson, opinion No. 19518, November 15, 1972.
40. Fuller v. State of South Carolina, No. 70-5017; and Atkinson v. State
of South Carolina, No. 69-5033.
41. State v. Poe, No. _-, State v. Leland, No. -, State v. Faust, No. -,
State v. Davis, No. -, and State v. Holland, No. -, all in the Court of
General Sessions for Aiken County.
42. Carlos Alsbrooks, commuted by Governor John C. West on April 12,
1971; John Morris, commuted by Governor West on May 14, 1971; and, Ed-
ward Williams, commuted by Governor West on June 7, 1971.
43. Bostick v. South Carolina, 286 U.S. 479 (1967), and Thomas v. Leeke,
403 U.S. 948 (1971).
44. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963) ; State v. White,
246 S.C. 507, 144 S.E.2d 481 (1965); State v. Swilling, 246 S.C. 144, 142
S.E.2d 864 (1965) ; State v. Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965) ; State
v. Bell, 250 S.C. 37, 156 S.E.2d 313 (1967); State v. Richburg, 250 S.C. 451,
158 S.E.2d 769 (1968) ; State v. Gamble, 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966) ;
State v. Cannon, 257 S.C. 425, 186 S.E.2d 413 (1972) ; and, State v. Hamilton,
257 S.C. 428, 186 S.E.2d 419 (1972).
45. Moorer v. South Carolina, 368 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1966).
46. State v. Wilson, Court of General Sessions for Richland County, April
28, 1972; Gamble v. South Carolina, Court of Common Pleas for Richland
County, May 2, 1971; Thomas v. Leeke, Court of Common Pleas for Richland
County; State v. Horne, Court of General Sessions for Spartanburg County,
October 10, 1969; Swilling v. MacDougal, Court of Common Pleas for Rich-
land County, December 14, 1968.
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thirteen defendants who won reversals, nine had their convic-
tions set aside, two of them twice.47 Of the nine, two were
thereafter declared mentally incompetent and have never
been retried ;48 four entered pleas of guilty on retrial and were
sentenced to a term of years ;49 one pleaded not guilty and on
retrial was convicted of a capital offense with the jury re-
turning a recommendation of mercy and was sentenced to life
imprisonment ;5 ° one pleaded not guilty and on retrial was
convicted of a non-capital offense and was sentenced to a
term of years ;51 and one was retried, found guilty, and again
sentenced to death. His sentence, however, was later reversed
by the Court of Common Pleas. During appeal by the State,
he died of a heart attack.52 The remaining four defendants
who won reversals had only their sentences set aside. On
resentencing each was given a term of life imprisonment."
47. Bostick v. South Carolina, 386 U.S. 479 (1967); State v. White,
243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963); State v. White, 246 S.C. 507, 144
S.E.2d 481 (1965) ; Moorer v. South Carolina, 268 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1966);
State v. Home, October 10, 1969, Court of General Sessions for Spartan-
burg County; State v. Swilling, 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E.2d 864 (1965); State
v. Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965) ; State v. Bell, 250 S.C. 37, 156
S.E.2d 313 (1967); State v. Richburg, 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968);
State v. Gamble, 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966) ; and Gamble v. South
Carolina, Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, May 21, 1971.
48. At an evaluation conducted on August 7, 1969, Hershel E. Cain was
found to be "mentally ill" and "currently unable to stand trial and participate
in his own defense" and on March 6, 1968, Willie James Bell was found to be
"mentally ill" and was retained for treatment pursuant to S.C. CoDE ANN.
§32-970 (1962), until his "mental condition improved sufficiently to warrant
a release." The State (Columbia, S.C.), April 4, 1968.
49. David White was sentenced on September 21, 1967, to 65 years; Louis
Moore, on April 4, 1967 to 33 years for common law rape; Ray Home upon
a plea of guilty on November 24, 1969 to life plus 10 years; and Ernest Gamble
to 40 years. The State (Columbia, S.C.), April 4, 1968.
50. Louis Bostick was retried on February 29, 1968. The State (Columbia,
S.C.), April 4, 1968.
51. Edward Richburg was retried and convicted of manslaughter in Rich-
land County, April 24, 1969, and was given 18 years.
52. See State v. Swirling, discussed p. 15, infra.
53. James Esther Thomas was resentenced to life imprisonment pursuant
to Thomas v. Leeke, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) and Thomas v. Leeke, 257 S.C. 504,
186 S.E.2d 552 (1971). Hamilton and Cannon also had their sentences set aside,
257 S.C. 428, 186 S.E.2d 419 (1972) and 257 S.C. 425, 186 S.E.2d 413 (1972).
James Wilson, Jr. was resentenced to life imprisonment on April 28, 1972,
pursuant to defendant's motion for reduction of sentence, relying on United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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The two capital cases from South Carolina in the Supreme
Court at the time of decision of Furman v. Georgia, were
reversed as to sentence along with the other death cases be-
fore the court.54 The effect of Furman, moreover, will be to
vacate the remaining nine sentences of death outstanding in
the state.rr
The cases catalogued above show that capital punishment
was as a matter of general practice abandoned by South Caro-
lina more than ten years before the decision of the Supreme
Court in Furman v. Georgia. This suspension of the death
penalty was not, as proponents of capital punishment urge,
the result of the application of technical or arbitrary decisions
of courts remote from the processes of State criminal justice.
Rather, it was the reflection of deeply felt doubts within that
system of justice of the propriety of capital punishment itself.
To be sure, the South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently
held that the death penalty expresses the public policy of the
State and is not in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 56
However, the cryptic holding in these decisions seems wholly
undermined by what the Court has done in actual cases before
it. The Supreme Court, for example, in every appeal involving
a capital conviction, has applied a special presumption against
the death penalty in the form of its rule in favorem vitae.
Derived from the common law it is a principle literally in
favor of life and liberty used "by the Courts of this State
aforetimes to avert a miscarriage of justice," and as a "haven
of refuge" from "grave injustice. ' 57 In capital cases the Court
will "search for prejudicial error, whether or not it was the
subject of appropriate request, objection or motion in the
54. Atkinson v. South Carolina, 33 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1972) ; and, Fuller v.
South Carolina, 33 L. Ed. 2d. 755 (1972).
55. By Order dated August 30, 1972, Judge J. A. Spruill, Jr. as Presiding
Judge of the Court of General Sessions for Aiken County, set aside the death
sentences of Holland, Leland, Faust, Poe and Davis: "All concede that, at a
minimum, the five defendants were entitled to a remand to the Court of General
Sessions for Aiken County for resentencing with the new sentence to be one
of life imprisonment." Slip Opinion, p. 2. Bellue's death sentence was reduced
to life by the Supreme Court of South Carolina on November 20, 1972, Opinion
No. 19520, and Gibson's on November 15, 1972, Opinion No. 19518.
56. State v. Gamble, 249, S.C. 605, 155 S.E2d 916 (1967), and State v.
Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970).
57. State v. Floyd, 174 S.C. 288, 332, 338, 177 S.E. 375 (1934). See State
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trial court . . . and any such omission on the part of counsel
will not be held to waive the Appellant's rights."5 8 Even where
the Court has "grave" doubts that errors actually assigned
require reversal, the rule is said to require a new trial, for if
"in ordering it we err, at least such error has not the finality
that affirmance on the present record would have."59
By application of the rule in favorem vitae the South
Carolina Supreme Court has been responsible for seven of the
eleven reversals of capital convictions in the state during the
past decade. 60 Of the remaining four reversals, one came from
the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, one from
the Court of General Sessions for York County, one from the
United States Supreme Court and one from the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit.61 More significantly, the re-
versals by the State Supreme Court were in every instance
based exclusively or substantially on State rather than federal
precedent or rule of law. In State v. White,612 the defendant
had requested the court to charge the jury not to draw any
prejudicial inference from his failure to take the stand. The
request was refused on the grounds that to call attention to
58. State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 495, 129 S.E2d 330 (1963).
59. State v. Livingston, 233 S.C. 400, 409, 105 S.E.2d 73 (1958).
60. The seven reversals are: State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320
(1963) ; State v. White, 246 S.C. 507, 144 S.E.2d 481 (1965); State v. Bell,
250 S.C. 37, 156 S.E.2d 313 (1967); State v. Richburg, 250 S.C. 451, 158
S.E.2d 769 (1968); State v. Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965); State
v. Swilling, 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E2d 864 (1965); State v. Gamble, 247 S.C.
214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966).
61. In Bostick v. South Carolina, 386 U.S. 479 (1967), a murder case, the
Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court's finding of no exclusion
of blacks from Bostick's grand and petit juries. "The judgment of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina is reversed. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)."
On retrial, Bostick was again convicted, but the jury returned a recommendation
of mercy. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on February 29, 1968. In
Moorer v. South Carolina, 368 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1966), the Court of Appeals
reversed for failure of the trial court to rule on and properly instruct the jury
concerning the voluntariness of statements made by the accused. Moorer subse-
quently entered a plea of guilty to common law rape and was sentenced on April
4, 1967, to 33 years imprisonment. In State v. Home, after trial and conviction,
Judge Frank Eppes granted defendant's motion for a new trial on the grounds
"that the ends of justice would be served by the granting of a new trial." Order
for a New Trial, November 10, 1969. At his second trial, Home plead guilty
and got life plus ten (10) years. And in Gamble v. South Carolina, Judge John
Grimball granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus reversing on grounds
of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 51 (1968). Order May 2, 1971.
62. 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963).
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it" would be perhaps more prejudicial than not."63 The Court,
relying on State v. King, State v. Cox, and State v. Howard,
6 4
construing Section 26-405, Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1962, as amended,6 5 held that an accused has the right to have
the trial court instruct the jury that failure to take the wit-
ness stand and testify on his own behalf does not create a
presumption against him, and upon his request, the court
must give that instruction. The verdict and sentence were
reversed upon this state ground and the case remanded for a
new trial. The additional reliance in State v. White, on Bruno
v. United States,66 was not constitutionally required in view
of the holding of the Court that the "narrow question" before
it was the proper application of 20 Statutes at Large 30, chap.
37, then 28 U.S.C.A. Section 632, rather than one of the
amendments of the Constitution of the United States which
might have been binding upon the states. "Concededly the
charge requested by Bruno was correct. The Act of March 16,
1878, gave him the right to invoke it." '67 White was convicted
on retrial and again given the death sentence. During argu-
ment to the jury the Solicitor made repeated references to the
mothers, wives, sisters and daughters of the jurors in an
effort to identify the facts of the case, which involved rape,
with their own mothers, wives, sisters or daughters. The
Supreme Court found this procedure to be error and reversed
the conviction citing State v. Gilstrap,68
In view of the absolute discretion of the jury with regard to the issue
of mercy, it is impossible to determine whether the argument actually
had a prejudicial effect upon the verdict. We do know, however, that
in asking the jury to determine such issue by relating the circum-
stances of the case to their loved ones, the Solicitor injected into the
case considerations foreign to the record and calculated to take from
the trial the necessary element of impartiality.69
It was significant that the case was a death case. That fact
63. Id. at 242, 133 S.E.2d at 322.
64. 158 S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1929); 221 S.C. 1, 68 S.E.2d 624 (1951);
35 S.C. 197, 14 S.E. 481 (1890).
65. §26-405 provides in part: "In the trial of all criminal cases the de-
fendant shall be allowed to testify if he desires to do so, and not otherwise,
as to the facts and circumstances of the case."
66. 308 U.S. 294 (1939).
67. 308 U.S. at 293.
68. 205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E.2d 163 (1944).
69. State v. White, 246 S.C. 502, 507, 144 S.E.2d at 483 (1965).
[Vol. 24
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alone seemed to require reversal. "While we seriously doubt
that the argument of the Solicitor had the claimed prejudicial
effect and reach our result with reluctance, the probability
of prejudice to the rights of the defendant are such that we
would not be justified in assuming in a death case that it did
not result.''70 At his third trial, White entered pleas of guilty
to two counts of rape and was sentenced to a total of 65 years
imprisonment on September 21, 1967. In State v. Bell,71 an-
other death case, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
on the grounds of irrelevant and inflamatory testimony hav-
ing been given at trial and because the trial judge erred in not
affording the defendant an opportunity prior to trial for a
meaningful examination and evaluation of his mental condi-
tion by a qualified psychiatrist whose assistance had been
enlisted by counsel. Again, the fact that this was a death case
was a controlling factor in the Court's decision. "Even if testi-
mony tending to establish insanity as a defense could not have
been developed, expert opinion evidence that the defendant
was affected by mental illness might well have been produced.
Such testimony may have influenced the jury in the exercise
of its discretion to recommend mercy and spare the defen-
dant's life."' 72 Prior to retrial, Bell was admitted to the State
Hospital for examination and was found to be "mentally ill."
He was retained for treatment under Section 32-970, Code of
Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended, until his "mental
condition improved sufficiently to warrant a release." He has
not as of this writing been retried.
State v. Richburg,73 another reversal in a capital case by
the South Carolina Supreme Court, turned upon construction
of state evidence law. The Court there found it error for the
Solicitor to attempt to impeach his own witness based upon
prior inconsistent statements where no evidence had been
given which was detrimental to the State's case at the time of
the claimed surprise. Richburg had a total of three trials. The
first in June, 1966, resulted in a mistrial. The second was
reversed for the reasons set out above. At the third, he was
70. Id., at 504 (emphasis supplied).
71. 250 S.C. 37, 156 S.E.2d 313 (1967).
72. 250 S.C. at 42-43 (emphasis in original).
73. 250 S.C. 451, 457, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968), relying upon State v. Nelson,
192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E.2d 72 (1940).
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convicted of manslaughter upon a plea of guilty and sentenced
to 18 years imprisonment.7
4
In State v. Cain,75 the Court citing State v. Clinkscales
and State v. Gardner76 reversed the conviction and sentence
in a capital case due to the failure of the trial judge to give
any instructions to the jury regarding the rules governing
confessions. Even though the trial judge had not been re-
quested by the defendant to instruct the jury on the question
of the voluntariness of his confession, "under the well recog-
nized practice of this Court, where the death penalty is in-
volved, these omissions on the part of counsel will not be held
to waive the rights of the appellant." 77 Prior to retrial Cain
was examined at the State Hospital on August 18, 1968, and
found to be "mentally ill." His last evaluation on August 7,
1969, found him to be "currently unable to stand trial and
participate in his own defense."
State v. Swilling,78 involved errors of the trial court in
charging that the jury could take into consideration the bad
reputation of the accused, and the solicitor in attempting to
impugn on cross examination the accused's character and
reputation where he had not put his character and reputation
in issue. Initially the Court applied the rule in favorem vitae
to consider matters not made the basis of any exception on
appeal, i.e. the cross examination of the accused and his wife
by the solicitor. In reversing the conviction, the Court scarcely
considered whether there had been any actual prejudice.
"Just what effect these matters had upon the jury is only known to
the members thereof. We simply reach the conclusion that such could
have affected the verdict in the case. If nothing more, such may well
have affected the jury, in the exercise of its discretion, as to whether
or not to recommend mercy. Our conclusions that the defendant here
is entitled to a new trial is, we think, clearly dictated by the numerous
prior decisions of this Court"
7 9
Swilling was retried on September 7, 1965, convicted and
again sentenced to death. His conviction was affirmed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court.80 Thereafter Judge John
74. State v. Richburg, 253 S.C. 458, 171 S.E2d 592 (1969).
75. 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965).
76. 231 S.C. 650, 99 S.E.2d 663 (1957) ; 219 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d 130 (1951).
77. 246 S.C. 536, 543, 144 S.E.2d at 908.
78. 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E.2d 864 (1965).
79. 246 S.C. 144, 152-53, 142 S.E.2d at 868.
80. State v. Swilling, 246 S.C. 541, 155 S.E2d 607 (1967).
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Grimball granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus and
set aside the death sentence on December 14, 1968 citing
Witherspoon v. Illinois.8 1 The state appealed and the Supreme
Court remanded on May 6, 1969, for a hearing on certain non-
Witherspoon issues contained in the petition.8 2 In the mean-
time, Swilling died of a heart attack at the Central Correc-
tional Institution on September 17, 1969.
Robert Wayne Gamble had two capital convictions re-
versed, one by the South Carolina Supreme Court and one
by the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County. 3
Gamble's first conviction for rape in 1963 was dismissed as
a result of the introduction into evidence of portions of a
confession dealing with crimes unrelated to the one being
prosecuted. The court relied upon State v. Bolin for the result
reached. s4 And once error was shown, the Court invoked the
familiar language of capital cases: "What effect the above
portion of the confession had upon the jury is only known
to the members thereof. When it is made to appear that any-
thing has occurred in a capital case which may have improp-
erly influenced the action of the jury, the accused should be
granted a new trial, although he may appear to be ever so
guilty."
85
On retrial in 1966, Gamble was convicted and again sen-
tenced to death. The Supreme Court of South Carolina af-
firmed and the United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari."" Thereafter he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County which
was granted. The record of the voir dire in the trial revealed
that 12 jurors had been excused for cause who expressed no
more than a general opposition to capital punishment. The
court found a violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois. An addi-
tional ground for reversal was the exclusion of Negroes from
81. 391 U.S. 51 (1968).
82. State v. Swilling, 252 S.C. 571, 167 S.E.2d 433 (1969).
83. State v. Gamble, 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E2d 709 (1966), and Order of
judge John Grimball, May 2, 1971, Court of Common Pleas for Richland
County.
84. 177 S.C. 57, 180 S.E. 809 (1935). "The portion of appellant's confession
relating to other crimes should have been eliminated before the confession was
submitted to the jury." 247 S.C. at 225.
85. State v. Gamble, 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966).
86. State v. Gamble, 249 S.C. 605, 155 S.E.2d 916 (1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 927 (1968).
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Gamble's grand jury. At his third trial Gamble entered a plea
of guilty to rape and was sentenced to a term of forty years.
8 7
Capital cases have always received special treatment from
the system of criminal justice.8 Where the accused is indigent
and counsel appointed, state law allows for the appointment
of two defense attorneys, one of whom must have a minimum
of five years of practice before the bar.8 9 The rule is other-
wise in non-capital cases. In capital cases, as we have seen,
doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant. Special rules
are promulgated for the consideration of errors. A showing
of actual prejudice is regarded as all but irrelevant and prece-
dent is made which has no correlation to other classes of crim-
inal cases. The concession is implicit that in capital cases once
sentence is executed there is no second chance for review.
Many appeals may be dismissed as frivolous, but almost never
those involving the death penalty. Death cases are special
cases and but for the fact that human life is involved, they
command a disproportionately large amount of the judiciary's
time. Barrett Prettyman, a former United States Supreme
Court law clerk observes that regardless of the issues of law
involved each Justice on the Court gives meticulous attention
to the file when he sees the label "capital case" printed in red
on the outside cover. "In fact, the capital case receives more
attention than any other class of cases coming before the
Court." 90 The court's treatment of capital cases is vivid tri-
bute to the deep seated reservations about capital punishment
which demonstrably lie at the heart of modern criminal
justice."'
87. See Note 49, supra.
88. Furman v. Georgia, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 376, n. 34, and Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 28 (1956). ("It is the universal experience in the administration
of criminal justice that those charged with capital offenses are granted special
consideration.")
89. S.C. CODE ANN. §17-507 (1962). See State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258,
122 S.E.2d 622 (1961).
90. B. PRETTYMAN, DEATH AND THE SUPI-EIE CouRT, at 305 (1961).
91. Louis Moorer's years in state and federal court trying to outwit the
hangman and escape the death sentence are not atypical of capital cases. Moorer
was sentenced to death on April 4, 1962. He appealed and the Supreme Court
affirmed. State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 129 S.E.2d 330 (1963). He then filed
a notice of intent to petition the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of
Certiorari, but prior to the expiration of the 90-day perfection period, aban-
doned certiorari and petitioned the Court of Common Pleas for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging for the first time exclusion of blacks from his grand and petit
[Vol. 24
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
As a prelude to Furman v. Georgia, the past five years
saw more litigation in the Supreme Court attacking the death
penalty on constitutional grounds than ever before. Two de-
juries. The petition was denied after hearing on May 17, 1963. Moorer filed a
notice of appeal but the Court of Common Pleas ordered another hearing on the
original petition to determine if Moorer had a preliminary hearing prior to
trial and if so whether any new grounds for relief under habeas corpus were
present. The additional hearing was held on August 30, 1963, after which the
Court issued its order denying relief. Moorer appealed from both orders to the
South Carolina Supreme Court which resolved all asserted errors against him.
Moorer v. South Carolina, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d 713 (1964). The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Moorer v. South Carolina, 379 U.S.
860 (1964). Moorer's next step was to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the Federal District Court which granted a stay of execution. Moorer v.
South Carolina, 240 F. Supp. 529 (D.S.C. 1965). The District Court held a
further hearing on whether the stay of execution should be continued on De-
cember 14, 1964, after which it entered its order continuing the stay pending
a determination of the issues involved in the petition. Moorer v. South Carolina,
240 F. Supp. 531, 532 (D.S.C. 1964). However, on March 11, 1965, Moorer
filed an amended petition to the effect that some of the issues raised had not
been presented to the state courts, i.e., the constitutionality of S. C. CoDn ANN.
§16-71 (1962), the general rape statute, and questioned whether petitioner had
exhausted his state remedies. By order dated March 12, 1965, the District Court
suspended further consideration of the petition and extended the stay of execu-
tion only until the parties should have the opportunity to show cause why the
Court should not relinquish jurisdiction. Moorer v. South Carolina, 239 F. Supp.
180 (D.S.C. 1965). A hearing was duly held after which the District Court
relinquished jurisdiction and vacated the stay of execution. Moorer v. South
Carolina, 249 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.S.C. 1965). On March 31, 1965, Moorer filed
another petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Common Pleas.
In the meantime, a new execution date had been set for him for May 14, 1965.
He thereupon requested a stay of excution pending a hearing on the petition
from the Supreme Court but was denied. "We conclude that there is no merit
in any of the grounds now asserted by the defendant" Moorer v. MacDougal,
245 S.C. 633, 639, 142 S.E.2d at 50 (1965). The Court directed that the sen-
tence previously imposed be executed on May 14, 1965. Moorer next petitioned
the District Court for relief which dismissed without a hearing on May 12, 1965.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay of execution and
found that the petition contained several non-frivolous allegations of denial of
federal constitutional rights and that the dismissal without either an evidentiary
hearing or consideration of the record was erroneous. The decision below was
vacated and the cause remanded for a full evidentiary hearing. Moorer v. South
Carolina, 347 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1965). A pre-trial conference was held in the
District Court, Moorer v. South Carolina, 244 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.S.C. 1965),
and a hearing, after which, the court denied relief and dismissed the petition.
Moorer again appealed to the Fourth Circuit which reversed his conviction on
the grounds that the trial judge bad failed to rule on the voluntariness of state-
20
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cisions, United States v. Jackson92 and Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois9 3 invalidated long standing state procedures and statutes
requiring potentially sweeping changes in the application of
the death penalty across the country. In McGautha v. Cali-
fornia,9 4 the Court by a six to three margin refused to declare
unconstitutional the single verdict procedure in capital cases
and the exercise by juries of absolute and unguided discretion
in recommending or withholding mercy. Capital punishment
was also attacked elsewhere. The Court of Appbals for the
Fourth Circuit held in Ralph v. Warden95 that imposition of
death for rape where the victim was not substantially harmed
physically constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In an
historic decision the California Supreme Court declared the
death penalty in violation of its state law.
The dignity of man, the individual and the society as a whole, is today
demeaned by our continued practice of capital punishment. Judged by
contemporary standards of decency, capital punishment is impermissi-
bly cruel. It is being increasingly rejected by society and is now almost
wholly repudiated by those most familiar with its processes. Measured
by the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society," capital punishment is, therefore, cruel within the
meaning of Article I, section 6 of the California Constitution.9 6
Witherspoon, which struck down the practice of excusing
for cause those jurors in capital cases who expressed only a
general opposition to the death penalty, has had almost no
impact in South Carolina.97 South Carolina's procedure in
ments made by Moorer and failed to instruct the jury concerning them. Moorer
v. South Carolina, 368 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1966). Confronted with another five
years of appeals and reviews the state accepted a plea of guilty to common law
rape on April 4, 1967 and sentenced Moorer to thirty-three years. From the
state's point of view, capital cases are notoriously expensive. PRESIDENT'S CoM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE TASS
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967), at 27.
92. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
93. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
94. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). Since South Carolina employs the single verdict
system whereby the jury determines both guilt and sentence simultaneously,
had the ruling in McGautha been favorable to the petitioners all outstanding
death sentences in the state would have been reversed.
95. 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 33 L.Ed. 766 (1972).
96. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 650-51, 493 P2d at 895, 100 Cal.Rptr.
at 167 (1972).
97. "Whatever else might be said of capital punishment, it is at least clear
that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be squared with due process."
.391 U.S. at 523.
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impaneling capital juries was analogous to the one condemned
in Witherspoon. In State v. Britt, a pre-Witherspoon decision,
the Court acknowledged that: "We have held in a murder case,
refusing to allow a juror to serve on the case, after admitting
on his voir dire examination his disbelief in capital punish-
ment for murder, was not error."9 8 Only two post-Witherspoon
cases have turned upon that decision. In neither, however, was
the Witherspoon issue dispositive. In State v. Swilling,19 the
state appealed a reversal by the circuit court based upon
Witherspoon but prior to a decision on appeal the case was
mooted by the death of the defendant. In the other case, State
v. Gamble,100 non-Witherspoon issues, i.e. exclusion of blacks
from grand and petit juries, were present and furnished inde-
pendent grounds for reversal. Since Witherspoon, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has found state procedures to be in
conformity with that decision. 10 1
Unlike Witherspoon, United States v. Jackson did have a
substantial impact upon capital cases in South Carolina. Jack-
son struck down the death penalty provisions of the Federal
Kidnapping Act which provided that a defendant "shall be
punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been
liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so
recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years
or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed." 10 2 The Court
reasoned that since only a jury could impose death and since
nothing greater than life could be imposed if a plea of guilty
was accepted pursuant to Rule 11 or jury trial waived pur-
suant to Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure that the effect of the statutory scheme was to place an
98. 237 S.C. 293, 304, 117 S.E.2d at 385 (1960).
99. 252 S.C. 571, 167 S.E2d 433 (1969).
100. Order of Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, May 21, 1971.
101. See State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 536, 172 S.E. at 113 (1970) :
"Only those members of the panel were excused who stated that their opposition
to capital punishment could not be changed by evidence." Cf. Crawford v.
Bounds, 395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1968), finding that jurors in capital cases even
if disqualified under Witherspoon are not precluded from service on trial juries
assuming their scruples would permit a fair determination on the issue of guilt.
Since Witherspoon was deliberately limited to the narrow issue of imposition
of sentence by scrupled jurors, it never decided the issue of determination of
guilt by such a jury, leaving the ruling in Crawford intact. Thus, the holding
in State v. Atkinson, supra, while correct under Witherspoon, falls short of
the requirements of Crawford.
102. 18 U.S.C. §1201 (a).
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unlawful condition upon the Fifth Amendment right to plead
not guilty and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury,
i.e. the risk of death. Accordingly, the death penalty provi-
sions of the statute were declared unconstitutional.
0
South Carolina's capital punishment scheme was similar
to that condemned in Jackson. The penalty for murder, killing
by stabbing, lynching, killing in a duel, rape, assault with
attempt to rape, carnal knowledge, kidnapping where the vic-
tim is not released alive prior to trial and conspiracy to kidnap
is death except that upon recommendation by the jury of
mercy the penalty is life imprisonment. 04 Prior to Jackson
state law provided that: "In all cases where by law the pun-
ishment is affected by the jury recommending the accused
to the mercy of the court, and a plea of guilty is accepted with
the approval of the court, the accused shall be sentenced in
like manner as if the jury in a trial had recommended him
to the mercy of the court.10
The effect of Jackson upon South Carolina's capital pun-
ishment scheme was first considered by the Supreme Court in
State v. Harper.100 Harper involved an appeal by the state
from the trial court's order quashing a murder indictment on
the grounds that the penalty provisions of Sections 16-52 and
17-553.4, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended,
violated Jackson. The court held that Section 17-553.4 allow-
103. Cf. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 (1970), Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790 (1970) and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), cases
rejecting the claim that Jackson type penalty schemes also render unconstitu-
tional and involuntary pleas of guilty. "Plainly, it seems to us, Jackson ruled
neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sen-
tence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are invalid whether
involuntary or not. Jackson prohibits the imposition of the death penalty under
§1201 (a), but that decision neither fashioned a new standard for judging the
validity of guilty pleas or mandated a new application of the test theretofore
fashioned by the courts and since reiterated that guilty pleas are valid if both
"voluntary" and "intelligent." 397 U.S. at 747. Breland v. State, 253 S.C. 187,
169 S.E.2d 604 (1969); Quillien v. Leeke, 303 F. Supp. 698 (D.S.C. 1969).
104. The death penalty is apparently mandatory for a third conviction for
crimes punishable by death: ". . . he shall be subjected to the maximum sen-
tence provided for such crime." S.C. CODE ANN. §17-533.1 (1962). The remain-
ing capital crimes in South Carolina, giving aid or information to the enemy
in time of war, leave the matter of sentencing entirely to the discretion of the
court. S.C. CODE ANN. §§44-353, 44-354 (1962).
105. S.C. CODE ANN. §17-553.4 (1962). §17-553.4 was enacted in 1962, the
year of the last executions in South Carolina.
106. 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968).
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ing imposition of a life sentence upon acceptance by the Court
of a plea of guilty was unconstitutional since it placed an
unlawful condition upon the exercise of the right to trial by
jury. The result finally reached, however, was unlike that in
Jackson. The Court reasoned that since the general murder
statute, Section 16-52, was enacted in 1894, and Section 17-
553.4 in 1962, in the absence of any evidence of legislative
intent to give a defendant an absolute right to enter a plea
of guilty, the two provisions were severable. "Hereafter, re-
gardless of past custom and practice, the choice between life
imprisonment and the death penalty must be left by the trial
courts in this state to the jury in every case, in accord with
Section 16-52, regardless of how the defendant's guilt has been
determined, whether by the verdict of the jury or by a plea
of guilty."'1 ° 7 Thus, Jackson, far from ameliorating the death
penalty in South Carolina, actually made its imposition more
likely. A case in point is that of Louis Fuller, Jr., who changed
his plea of not guilty to one of guilty at the close of the state's
case in an obvious attempt to invoke the mercy of the court.
The jury promptly sentenced him to the electric chair. 0 8
While the immediate effect of Jackson was to make the
death penalty more likely in capital cases, it was ultimately
responsible for vacating the death sentence in four cases in
the state. 0 9 Thomas v. Leeke,"10 the first of those cases in-
volved a sentence of death actually imposed under a pre-
Jackson scheme. Thomas was convicted of rape, sentenced to
death and his conviction affirmed.:"' Thereafter he petitioned
the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that his
sentence was unconstitutional under Jackson. The circuit court
agreed and remanded him to the Court of General Sessions
for resentencing in accord with Section 16-72 as if the jury
had recommended mercy. The state appealed and the Supreme
Court reversed the vacation of the death penalty decreed by
the circuit court." 2 In spite of the holding in Jackson that it
was the death penalty provision of the statute there involved
which was unconstitutional, and in spite of its own decision
107. 251 S.C. at 385.
108. State v. Fuller, 254 S.C. 260, 174 S.E2d 774 (1970).
109. See note 53, supra.
110. 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
111. State v. Thomas, 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966).
112. Thomas v. Leeke, 257 S.C. 491, 186 S.E.2d 516 (1970).
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in State v. Harper declaring South Carolina's capital punish-
ment scheme for murder unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
found that a death sentence administered under the South
Carolina scheme was constitutional on the anomalous theory
that since Thomas had pleaded not guilty and gone to trial
that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights had not in fact
been deterred.1 1 3 Thomas petitioned the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari which was granted. In a per curiam opin-
ion the court remanded the case to the state for further pro-
ceedings in light of Jackson."4 Thereafter on January 20,
1972, the South Carolina Supreme Court entered its order
reinstating the decree of the circuit court that Thomas should
be resentenced in accord with the provision of Section 16-72
as if the jury had recommended him to the mercy of the
court."" On the same day the Court vacated two other death
sentences and on April 28, 1972, the Court of Common Pleas
for Richland County vacated a third and last of those given
under the state's pre-Jackson scheme."l6
113. The fact that State v. Harper involved murder (§16-52) and Thomas
v. Leeke rape (§16-72) does not distinguish the two cases since both involved
§17-553.4. However, a defendant who entered a plea of guilty in a murder case
was assured a life sentence while a defendant entering a plea of guilty in a
rape case could be sentenced to from five to forty years.
114. Thomas v. Leeke, 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
115. Thomas v. Leeke, 257 S.C. 504, 186 S.E.2d 522 (1972).
116. The State (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 21, 1972 at 1. Following his con-
viction in 1966, Leonard Hamilton appealed to the South Carolina Supreme
Court which remanded his case to the trial court for a determination of whether
police officers had probable cause for his arrest. State v. Hamilton, 251 S.C. 1,
159 S.E.2d 607 (1968). On remand the trial court found probable cause and
the Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Hamilton, 256 S.C. 448, 182 S.E.2d 890
(1970). However, the Court vacated sentence in response to Thomas v. Leeke,
siupra.
Frank Cannon was convicted of rape and sentenced to death in 1965, three
years before Jackson. On appeal the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court
with instructions to make a determination whether defendant's confession was
voluntary. State v. Cannon, 248 S.C. 596, 151 S.E2d 752 (1966). The trial
court made a general finding of voluntariness. The defendant appealed and
again the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court, finding that its con-
clusions were too general to form the basis for a proper review and instructing
it to make further and specific findings upon the issue of voluntariness, includ-
ing the legality of a search and whether articles recovered as a result of it
induced the confession. State v. Cannon, 250 S.C. 437, 158 S.E.2d 351 (1967).
Cannon's sentence, like that of Hamilton, was vacated on January 20, 1972.
John Wilson, Jr. was sentenced to death in 1967. He filed a notice of
appeal but never docketed his case in the Supreme Court due to the failure of
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The major constitutional decisions of the last five years
involving the death penalty thus accounted for not one single
reversal of conviction in South Carolina. Jackson was respon-
sible for the reversal of a number of sentences but had the
ultimate effect of making imposition of the death penalty
more likely. If indeed the application of the death penalty in
South Carolina has been inhibited, the true cause is not to
be found in the federal courts.
John Wilson, Jr. was sentenced to death in 1967. He filed
a notice of appeal but never docketed his case in the Supreme
Court due to the failure of the parties to settle the case and
exceptions on appeal. The state finally moved in the trial
court for a dismissal of the appeal and the defendant moved
for vacation of sentence under Jackson-Thomas. The defen-
dant's motion was granted and Wilson's sentence reduced to
life imprisonment on April 28, 1972.
V. EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
The recent grants of executive clemency in South Caro-
lina further reflect fundamental reservations about the pro-
priety of the death penalty. 17 Clemency is by nature an extra-
judicial process and is generally granted upon the unique or
the parties to settle the case and exceptions on appeal. The state finally moved
in the trial court for a dismissal of the appeal and the defendant moved for
vacation of sentence under Jackson-Thomnas. The defendant's motion was
granted and Wilson's sentence reduced to life imprisonment on April 28, 1972.
117. The South Carolina Constitution gives the Governor virtually abso-
lute power to commute death sentences to life imprisonment. "The Governor
shall have power to grant reprieves and to commute a sentence of death to
that of life imprisonment. The granting of all other clemency to convicted
persons shall be vested absolutely in a Probation, Parole and Pardon Board
.. " S.C. CONST., art. IV, §11. The Governor is also charged to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed in mercy." S.C. CONsT., art. IV, §12. Cf.
State v. Harrison, 122 S.C. 523, 527 (1922), commenting upon the analogous
Constitutional authority of the Governor to issue reprieves: "The power to
grant reprieves is conferred upon the Governor by the Constitution, and there
is no limitation whatever placed upon the exercise of such power, either by the
Constitution or by the Statute. The Courts have not the power to inquire into
the reasons which may have actuated the Governor in granting a reprieve. If
it should be declared that the Courts have such power of inquiry, then the
right of the Governor to grant a reprieve would become a judicial, as well
as a question for the executive department of the government, which unques-
tionably has not been shown to have been intended."
787
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particular facts of a given case."" As a result, it is often
argued that the constitutionality or wisdom of the death pen-
alty itself is not an appropriate consideration for the exercise
of the special clemency powers. However, implicit in any
grant of clemency is the application of a constitutional stan-
dard involving social acceptance of capital punishment." 9 At
least five Justices of the Supreme Court have recognized as
much. "Executive clemency . . provides a common means
of avoiding unconstitutional or otherwise questionable exe-
cutions." 20 More recently, Justice Blackmun acknowledged
that abolition of the death penalty lies in part on the execu-
tive branches of state and federal government. 12 . That clem-
ency belies a constitutional basis was conceded in two of the
three grants of executive clemency in South Carolina since
1962, where the cruel and unusual aspect of extended incar-
ceration under the sentence of death was cited as a main
reason for the action taken. In commuting the sentence of
John Morris, an 86-year-old man in failing health, Governor
John C. West noted that the "continued uncertainty regarding
the validity of the death sentence" and the "peculiar circum-
stances of this situation, particularly the advanced age of the
defendant," including the nine years he had spent on death
row, "might well lead to the conclusion that it [the death
sentence] constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."'' 22 And
118. See Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
136 (1964).
119. Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,
83 HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1815-18 (1970).
120, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 477 (1947). In
recent years at least two governors have commuted death sentences solely on
Eighth Amendment grounds. Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rnv. 136 at 176 (1964).
121. Furman v. Georgia, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 448.
122. Executive Order of Governor John C. West, May 14, 1971. The Gov-
ernor also noted that 81% of the 241 people executed since 1911 when death
sentences began to be carried out by the State rather than the counties im-
posing sentence have been Negro and two-thirds semi-skilled laborers. John
Morris is black, has had no formal education and was formerly a house painter.
It is also significant that all those sentenced to death for the crime of rape
since 1962 have been black. In each instance the victim was white. See gen-
erally, SPECIAL REPORTS OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, "Race Makes
the Difference: An Analysis of Sentence Disparity Among Black and White
Offenders in Southern Prisons" (March 1969), and "Southern Justice: An
Indictment," at 5 (Oct. 18, 1965) : "Despite the fact that more than half of all
convicted rapists are white, 87 percent of all persons executed for rape be-
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in commuting the death sentence of 81-year-old Edward Wil-
liams, Morris's accomplice, the Governor again noted that
"his advanced age . . . on 'death row' might well constitute
cruel and unusual punishment."' 23 The remaining commuta-
tion was the result of "unanimous agreement" of the prose-
cuting attorneys, the Sheriff and others involved in the case
"that clemency should be granted the defendant."'
124
The doubts about the imposition of the death sentence
contained in the Executive Orders quoted from above may
not be discounted as the mere personal opinion of John C.
West who happens also to be Governor. For clemency, exer-
cised as it is by the chief elected official of the State, is by
its nature responsive to public opinion. It is doubtful that
tween 1930 and 1963 were Negroes convicted and sentenced by southern courts."
In South .Carolina, of the 35 executions for rape since 1911, 30 were of Negroes,
and of the 27 executions for assault with intent to ravish, all were of Negroes.
In view of the fact that state juries may constitutionally exercise absolute
discretion in giving or withholding mercy in capital cases and the fact that
the history of jury selection in southern states has largely been one of exclusion
of blacks, these figures are not surprising. See, e.g., United States cx rel.
Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82 (5th Cir. 1959), where the court said:
"As judges of a Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think that
it is our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers residing in many southern
jurisdictions rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic
exclusion of Negroes from juries." For a more recent pronouncement, see the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Furman v. Georgia, 33 L. Ed. 2d
at 37: "The statistics that have been referred to us cover periods when Negroes
were systematically excluded from jury service and when racial segregation
was official policy in many states."
123. Executive Order of Governor John C. West, June 7, 1971. Additional
reasons for commutation were the absence of a prior criminal history and a
good prison record. The convictions of both Morris and Williams were af-
firmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, State v. Morris, 243 S.C. 225,
133 S.E.2d 744 (1963), and certiorari denied by the United States Supreme
Court, Morris v. South Carolina, 377 U.S. 1001 (1964), rehearing denied, 379
U.S. 873 (1964). Later habeas corpus proceedings in federal court, Williams v.
State, 237 F. Supp. 360 (D.S.C. 1965) and Morris v. State, 356 F.2d 432 (4th
Cir. 1966), were suspended so that the defendants could exhaust state remedies.
The Court of Common Pleas denied relief and both Morris and Williams ap-
pealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Their sentences were commuted
while the appeals were pending, whereupon Morris withdrew his appeal. Wil-
liams's appeal was duly heard and the lower court's decision affirmed. Williams
v. Leeke, 257 S.C. 104, 184 S.E2d 441 (1971). In view of commutation the
court found the capital punishment issues to be moot.
124. Executive Order of Governor John C. West, April 12, 1971.
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it could or would be exercised without the implied approval
of the larger community. 125
There is no evidence that these recent grants of clemency
have been antagonistic to public opinion, or that there has
been any movement to limit by constitutional amendment or
otherwise the Governor's powers to remove the sentence of
death. The objective data available suggests that through his
grants of clemency the Governor has expressed the general
sentiment of the people.
VI. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ABOLITIONIST TRENDS
The trend towards abolition is not limited to South Caro-
lina. As has been repeatedly pointed out, nothing has been so
significant about the death penalty in the United States as
its infrequent application. 126 In 1935 an annual high of 199
people were executed. Since then, the number has fitfully but
steadily declined. Institutional killing stopped altogether in
1967.127
Table 1 Annual Executions in United States
128
1935-199 1948-119 1961- 42
1936-195 1949-119 1962- 47
1937-147 1950- 82 1963- 21
1938-190 1951-105 1964- 15
1939-160 1952- 83 1965- 7
1940-124 1953- 62 1966- 1
1941-123 1954- 81 1967- 2
1942-147 1955-- 76 1968- 0
1943-131 1956- 65 1969- 0
125. "Pardon, in its societal sense, as opposed to personal forgiveness,
presupposes the existence of an authority vested with the power to define crim-
inal acts and to punish doers of the proscribed deeds. Consistent with this is
the notion that criminal responsibility is owed to a collective political entity
rather than to particular persons, such as the victim or his relations." 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. at 138.
126. "While de jure abolition has ebbed and flowed a de facto abolition
has practically become a reality in the United States." 2 NATIONAL CoMmiss o
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS (G.P.O. 1970),
1350-51; and Furman v. Georgia, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 379.
127. California and Colorado each carried out an execution in 1967,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUsTIcE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS:
CAPITAL PUNISHIMTENT 1930-1970, at 11 (1971) [hereinafter NPS].
128. NPS at 8.
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1944-120 1957- 65 1970- 0
1945-117 1958- 49 1971- 0
1946-131 1959- 49 1972- 0
1947-153 1960- 56
To date, nine states and two federal territories have
completely abolished capital punishment-Michigan in 1963,
Wisconsin in 1953, Maine in 1876, Minnesota in 1911, Alaska
in 1957, Hawaii in 1957, Oregon in 1914, Iowa in 1872, West
Virginia in 1965, Puerto Rico in 1929 and the Virgin Islands
in 1957.129 Five other states retained it for use in special
circumstances-Rhode Island for murder by a life termer,
North Dakota for treason and murder by a life termer, New
York for murder of a police officer or prison guard on duty,
kidnapping for ransom, and killing or destroying vital prop-
erty during war time, and New Mexico for killing a policeman




Abolition Jurisdictions in U. S. (With Abolition Dates)13,
Michigan (1846) a Virgin Islands (1957)
Rhode Island (1852)b Oregon (1964)
Wisconsin (1853) Iowa (1965)
Maine (1887) West Virginia (1965)
North Dakota (1915)c New York (1965)d
Puerto Rico (1929) Vermont (1965)e
Alaska (1957) New Mexico (1969)1
Hawaii (1957)
a Death penalty retained for treason until 1968.
b Death penalty restored in 1882 for murder by life term
prisoner.
129. NPS at 50. Cf. the new federal capital crimes of air piracy (49 U.S.C.
§1472 (i), 1961), assassination of the President or Vice President (18 U.S.C.
§1751, 1965), and assassination of a member of Congress (18 U.S.C. §351,
1971).
130. See NPS at 50 and The Case Against Capital Plnishment, THE
WAsiiNGmNo RESEARCH PROJECT at 8 (1971). South Carolina maintains the
death sentence for the following: murder (§16-52); killing by stabbing (§16-
54) ; lynching (§16-57) ; killing in a duel (§16-63); rape, assault with attempt
to rape, carnal knowledge (§16-72, 80); kidnapping where victim is not re-
leased alive before trial (§16-91); conspiracy to kidnap (§16-92); third con-
viction for crimes optionally punishable by death (§17-553.1); and giving in-
formation or aid to the enemy in time of war (§§44-353, 354).
131. Id.
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Death penalty retained for murder by life term prisoner.
' Death penalty retained for murder of police officer on duty,
and for murder by life term prisoner.
Death penalty retained for murder of police officer or prison
guard on duty, kidnapping for ransom, and killing or
destruction of vital property by a group during wartime.
Death penalty retained for murder of policeman or prison
guard on duty, and for commission of second capital
felony.
Although a majority of foreign countries still retain the
death penalty a clear trend toward abolition is also apparent
internationally. The abolitionists jurisdictions include: Argen-
tina, Australia (Federal), New South Wales, Queensland,
Tasmania, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Finland, West Germany, Greenland, Honduras, Iceland, India
(Travencore), Israel, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Mex-
ico (Federal as well as 29 of 32 states), Monaco, Mozambique,
Nepal, Netherlands, Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nor-
way, Panama, Portugal, San Marino, Surinam, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vatican





Argentina 1922 Canada 1967c
Australia (Fed.) 1945 Colombia 1910
New South Wales 1955 Costa Rica 1880
Queensland 1922 Denmark 1930
Tasmania 1968 Dominican
Austria 1968 Republic 1924
Belgium 1863a Ecuador 1897
Bolivia 1961 Finland 1949
Brazil 1946 Germany, West 1949
132. Brief for Petitioner, Aikens v. California, No. 68-5027, United States
Supreme Court, at 2e-3e, and sources cited therein. Included in the abolitionist
states are Canada, Israel, Nepal, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the
Australian jurisdictions, which retain capital punishment for certain extra-
ordinary civil offenses. Also included are eight jurisdictions permitting execu-
tions under military law or in time of war-Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Italy,
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Vatican City State 1969
Venezuela 1863
a Excludes one soldier executed in 1918.
b De Facto only; date is last execution.
Statute abolishing capital punishment for murder expires
after a five year period (beginning 1967) if not renewed.
d Excludes one.
Each ten-year period since 1800 has seen an increase
both in the total number and rate of foreign jurisdictions
abandoning the death penalty.13 4
VII. CONCLUSION
Those who favor retention of capital punishment insist
that certain crimes can be deterred only by the threat of the
death sentence, as for example murder of prison guards by
life termers. The experience of penal officials, however, has
not shown this to be the case. According to Lewis Lawes,
former warden of Sing Sing:
I believe that nearly all wardens are united in agreeing that as a group
[life termers] constitute the most reliable and dependable men in the
institution. In a great majority of cases the murderer is not criminal
in his nature as we ordinarily understand this term. Given places of
trust and responsibility as they often are, these men invariably make
good.13 5
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Statistical surveys also show that prison personnel as well as
inmates do not experience a higher rate of assault or homicide
from life termers in jurisdictions which do not have the death
penalty than in those which do.13 6 Upon this authority it is
fair to conclude that the parole system and institutional con-
trol, including isolation are greater realities for inmates and
better deterrents to criminal behavior than the remote spectre
of the death penalty.
Opinion polls, as well as the recently insurgent death
penalty restoration movement, might reflect a society deeply
divided on the issue of retention of capital punishment. But
as Justice Brennan noted in his concurring opinion in Furman
v. Georgia: "The acceptability of a severe punishment is mea-
sured . . .by its use.1 3 7 The use of capital punishment in
South Carolina and the Nation shows that that punishment
is no longer accepted. Upon the recent authority of the Su-
preme Court, efforts to resurrect it would embroil the State
in yet another expensive, time consuming exercise in waste
and futility.
Corrections officials dispute that capital punishment
serves a legitimate purpose.138 The executive concedes that
it is unconstitutional and the courts refuse to impose it. The
time has now come for the State frankly to acknowledge that
the death penalty has been relegated to our history.
136. H. BEDAU (ed.), THE HUMAN SIDE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERiCA at 497 (1967). See also SELLIN, CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT (1967).
137. 33 L. Ed. 2d at 372.
138. "The present director of South Carolina prisons, William D. Leeke,
is opposed to the death penalty, partly because he believes that too many poor
defendants die while wealthier ones hire lawyers better able to get them life
sentences, or even freedom ... Leeke, who is also president of the State Cor-
rectional Administrators Association . . . said that most prison directors in
recent surveys said they favor abolishing the death penalty." Atlanta Journal-
Atlanta Constitution, January 30, 1972.
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